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Abstract 
Recent macroeconomic experience has drawn attention to the importance of 
interdependence among countries through financial markets and institutions, 
independently of traditional trade linkages. This paper develops a model of the 
international transmission of shocks due to interdependent portfolio holdings 
among leverage-constrained financial institutions. In the absence of leverage 
constraints, international portfolio diversification has no implications for 
macroeconomic co-movements. When leverage constraints bind, however, the 
presence of diversified portfolios in combination with these constraints introduces 
a powerful financial transmission channel which results in a high correlation 
among macroeconomic aggregates during business cycle downturns, quite 
independent of the size of international trade linkages. 
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LEVERAGE CONSTRAINTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSMISSION OF SHOCKS 
Michael Devereux and James Yetman 
1.  Introduction 
The global financial crisis has highlighted the critical role of financial markets in 
the propagation of business cycle shocks, both in transmitting shocks from one 
country to another and in magnifying the effects of those shocks. One key aspect of 
this linkage, seen in both the current crisis as well as the Asian and Russian crises a 
decade ago, is the importance of balance sheet linkages among firms and financial 
institutions across countries. This implies that asset price collapses in one country 
are transmitted internationally through deteriorations in the balance sheets of 
institutions in countries holding portfolios of similar assets.  
It is widely agreed that high financial leverage – a high ratio of assets to underlying 
capital – is a critical factor in magnifying the effects of financial crises. As asset 
values decline, highly levered financial institutions find their net worth sharply 
eroded. These institutions are forced to shed assets to avoid unacceptable risks of 
insolvency. But asset sales drive asset values down further, adversely impairing the 
balance sheets of other institutions. These institutions in turn are forced to sell 
assets, creating a vicious cycle of balance sheet deterioration and asset sales. While 
the financial dynamics of such balance sheet adjustments have been widely 
discussed elsewhere, it is less well understood how this process affects 
macroeconomic outcomes, or that this process alone may generate an immediate 
and powerful international transmission of shocks.  
A clear prerequisite for balance sheet adjustments to have powerful 
macroeconomic effects is the presence of some type of financial frictions or 
distortions in credit markets. After all, in a Modigliani-Miller world, leverage is 
irrelevant. Thus, in order to capture the dynamics of the financial meltdown, 
financial frictions will be of critical importance.  
In the context of the international transmission of business cycles, however, other 
puzzles arise. Most models of business cycle transmission still rely on international 
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linkages due to trade flows. While global trade has been growing at remarkable 
rates over the past two decades, it is still the case that the major economic regions 
of the world – the United States, Asia and Europe – are to a large extent ‘closed’ 
economies, with the export share from one region to another representing only a 
small proportion of overall GDP. Kose and Yi (2006) find that using conventional 
international real business cycle models, it is hard to account for the magnitude of 
business cycle co-movements among countries. In addition, there is evidence that 
business cycle co-movement is greater between countries with greater financial 
integration (Imbs 2004, 2006). Nevertheless, in the standard international business 
cycle model, enhanced international financial integration actually tends to reduce 
business cycle co-movement (Heathcote and Perri 2002, 2005). But   
Krugman (2008) suggests that traditional multi-country business cycle models lack 
a critical ‘international finance multiplier’, by which financial shocks in one 
country affect investment both in that country and in other countries through 
financial or balance sheet linkages.  
This paper develops a theoretical model of a balance sheet channel for the 
international transmission of shocks. The model emphasises how a process of 
balance sheet contractions, generated by a downturn in one country, is spread 
around the globe through interconnected portfolios. In the presence of leverage 
constraints, we show that this gives rise to a separate financial transmission 
mechanism of business cycle shocks that is completely independent of trade 
linkages.1 In fact, we work with a highly stripped down one-world-good model in 
which, in steady state, there are no trade linkages across countries at all.  
The paper’s main contribution is to compare how macro shocks are transmitted 
under two financial market structures. We do not attempt to provide an integrated 
explanation of the recent crisis, but instead highlight how the joint process of 
balance sheet constraints and portfolio interdependence generate an important 
cross-country propagation effect. We develop a two-country model in which 
                                           
1  In the recent literature, for example Krugman (2008), the adjustment of balance sheets is 
sometimes referred to as ‘deleveraging’. This term is inaccurate as a description of our model, 
since, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the leverage ratio is constant. Nonetheless, the 
process of satisfying leverage constraints in the wake of asset price declines does impart a 
magnification effect on real activity. The endogenisation of the leverage ratio represents a 
separate issue, beyond the scope of this paper. For a recent contribution, see 
Geanakoplos (forthcoming). 
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investors borrow from savers in each country, and invest in fixed assets. Investors 
also diversify their portfolios across countries and hold equity positions in the 
assets of the other country, as well as their own. Investors cannot commit to repay 
savers, however, and so they may face limits on the maximum amount of leverage 
on their balance sheets. We look at one environment where leverage limits do not 
bind. In this case the international transmission of shocks is quite limited. 
Specifically, there is no international transmission due to balance sheet 
adjustments. A negative productivity shock, which leads to a fall in the value of 
assets in one country, will cause financial institutions to sell some assets and 
reduce their debt exposure, but this does not affect other countries. In fact, in other 
countries, investors increase their borrowing. More broadly, business cycle 
fluctuations across countries are essentially uncorrelated in the absence of limits on 
leverage.  
When leverage constraints are binding, however, there is a powerful transmission 
of shocks across countries. A fall in asset values in one country forces an 
immediate and large process of balance sheet contractions in that country’s 
financial institutions. But the fall in asset values leads to balance sheet 
deterioration in other countries that have internationally diversified asset 
portfolios, causing a sell-off in assets and a forced reduction in borrowing around 
the globe. This, in turn, drives a further sell-off in the first country, establishing a 
feedback loop. The end result is a large magnification of the initial shock, a large 
fall in investment, and highly correlated business cycles across countries during the 
resulting downturn.  
The scale of the propagation linkages depends not just on the presence of leverage 
constraints, but also on the degree of international portfolio diversification. We 
show that greater financial integration, which facilitates more diversified 
portfolios, will increase the degree of common business cycle co-movement. In 
this sense there is a trade-off between the benefits of international   
risk-sharing and the magnified international propagation mechanism.  
Finally, the model has implications for gross capital flows. We show that a 
negative shock that reduces investment in fixed assets in one country causes a 
scaling back of gross positions, leading to a fall in the holdings of foreign equity 
and an increase in the holding of home equity. But the magnitude of this gross 
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capital flow contraction is much bigger in the presence of binding leverage 
constraints.  
The model draws heavily on a number of separate literatures. First, and most 
importantly, we follow Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in imposing leverage limits on 
investors. This leads to a wedge between the effective returns faced by investors 
and savers, and can act as an amplification mechanism for business cycle shocks.2 
Second, we emphasise the linkages among countries through the presence of   
interconnected portfolios. Portfolio linkages, in a somewhat different context, have 
for some time been seen as important in the contagion effects of financial shocks 
(see Rigobon 2003 and Pavlova and Rigobon 2008, for example). Finally, we 
introduce endogenous portfolio interdependence through the recently developed 
techniques of Devereux and Sutherland (forthcoming).3 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section provides some evidence of the 
importance of a financial channel in the recent global downturn. In Section 3, the 
basic two-country model is developed in which investors and savers interact, but 
investors may be limited by leverage constraints. Section 4 explores the effects of a 
negative productivity shock in one country, and demonstrates the role of balance 
sheet adjustments in the propagation of business cycle shocks across countries. 
Conclusions are drawn in Section 5. 
2.  Empirical Evidence  
We present some empirical evidence that supports our contention that balance 
sheet contractions may have been an important propagation mechanism for the 
global financial crisis. First, Figure 1 documents the global nature of the economic 
crisis, demonstrating a remarkably synchronous collapse in economic growth rates 
for a sample of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
                                           
2  An alternative mechanism where balance sheets play a key role in business cycles is the 
‘financial accelerator’ model of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). This has been 
extended to a multi-country setting by Gilchrist (2004). 
3  Dedola and Lombardo (2009) develop an interesting model similar to the present paper based 
on the financial accelerator model, incorporating endogenous portfolios as in the present 
paper. They emphasise a somewhat different type of transmission effect, unique to the 
financial accelerator model, coming from the direct connection between risk-premia across 
countries.  
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(OECD) countries. It is unlikely that trade linkages alone could account for the 
simultaneous downturns in all regions. If we take the US economy as the ultimate 
source of the financial crisis then it would be easy to explain the scale of the 
downturn in Mexico, for instance. But Figure 1 illustrates dramatic reductions in 
economic growth in many European economies, only marginally linked to the US 
through trade flows.  
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Sources:   RBA; Thomson Reuters 
In addition, there is clear evidence that US banks reduced their outstanding claims 
on the rest of the world. Table 1 contains short-term claims of US banks, for all 
OECD countries for which data are available. This is the total stock among US 
reporting banks of all claims on the destination economy with less than one year 
remaining until maturity. Under normal circumstances new claims are issued and 
many maturing existing claims are rolled over each quarter. A rapid decline in less 
than one year, then, implies little new issuance, and few exposures being rolled 
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over. There is a clear pattern overall that the largest OECD economies (by size of 
claims) have experienced a substantial fall in short-term US bank claims during 
2008. In particular France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Korea and Luxembourg all 
experienced major withdrawals over 2008. Further, total claims across all countries 
declined by more than 20 per cent, with half of that decline occurring in the final 
quarter. 
Table 1: Short-term Claims of US Banks on OECD Economies 
$US billion 
Destination of funds  2007:Q4  2008:Q1  2008:Q2  2008:Q3  2008:Q4 
Austria 4.2  4.2  4.8  3.6  2.3 
Belgium 8.7  13.9  17.5  15.8  15.6 
Czech Republic  0.5  0.7  0.8  0.9  0.5 
Finland 3.2  2.8  2.4  3.0  2.9 
France 58.0  69.1  41.8  44.4  55.3 
Germany 56.9  65.9  48.4  41.3  39.3 
Greece 3.9  4.9  3.0  2.3  2.4 
Hungary 0.9  1.0  0.9  1.1  0.5 
Ireland 28.3  27.5  28.1  27.8  23.6 
Italy 25.2  25.5  26.2  18.6  17.2 
Korea, South  26.3  27.4  28.0  29.9  21.5 
Luxembourg 26.1  24.7  22.8  21.7  11.9 
Mexico 6.5  7.8  7.5  6.8  7.7 
Netherlands 43.1  47.0  52.1  47.6  37.2 
Poland 2.4  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.5 
Portugal 2.9  2.3  2.1  1.7  1.2 
Spain 28.3  28.4  25.4  18.7  18.4 
Turkey 7.3  6.9  7.0  6.0  5.1 
Source:  BIS consolidated banking statistics 
 
Aside from bank balance sheets, we can also find evidence consistent with balance 
sheet contractions in other instruments. Equities in particular were believed by 
some policy-makers to be a means of contagion, as the following quote by 
Rakesh Mohan, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, indicates:  
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Our problems are mainly due to the sell-off by foreign institutional investors 
in the domestic equity markets leading to a sharp reduction in net capital 
inflows and the sharp slowdown in global economic activity and external 
demand. (Mohan 2009) 
This view is consistent with the data on international capital (Figure 2). The crisis 
has seen a fall in both US capital inflows and outflows, at the aggregate level. The 
scale of the fall in flows in early 2009 is unprecedented over the full sample of 
aggregate US Treasury International Capital (TIC) data going back to 1980. In the 
model developed later in this paper we will see that the balance sheet contractions 
implied by this, when combined with binding leverage constraints among financial 
institutions, can impart an independent international transmission of shocks. 





















2.1  Financial Linkages Versus Trade Linkages  
The effects of global balance sheet adjustments should be expected to vary by 
country. Some economies are more dependent on capital inflows than others, and 
countries with low credit ratings may suffer more from a sudden reduction in flows 
than higher-rated countries. Evidence of the effects of a financial channel should 
be consistent with the difference in vulnerabilities across countries. 
We demonstrate the importance of balance sheet contractions as a propagation 
mechanism for the crisis using regression analysis. As a rough measure of the 
international effect of the crisis, we use the change in the growth rate of real GDP 
between the year ended December 2007 and December 2008. The vulnerability of 
countries to a sudden outflow of capital is measured in terms of total capital 
inflows (TCI) from the United States, as a per cent of 2007 GDP, using US TIC 
data. Our sample includes members of the OECD for which these data are 
available (that is, all of the OECD other than Iceland and the Slovak Republic). We 
also include trade linkages, measured using exports to the United States in 2007 as 
a per cent of GDP (X). Finally, we interact each of these variables with the 
sovereign credit rating of the economy (CR), to capture the idea that capital 
withdrawals are likely to affect lower-rated economies more heavily than   
higher-rated ones due to a ‘flight to quality’. Based on Standard & Poor’s 
sovereign foreign currency credit rating in December 2007, we convert the credit 
rating to a numerical scale where a value of 0 corresponds to a AAA rating, 1 to a 
AA+ rating, and so on, down to 12 for a BB– rating. 
The results are shown in Table 2, and provide support for our argument that 
financial flows were a causal factor in the propagation of the crisis, while trade 
channels appear less important. First, the export variables (X and CRX) are never 
economically or statistically significant, and sometimes enter with the wrong sign. 
Second, our measure of capital flows (TCI) is statistically significant in all cases.4 
Third, the interactive term between the credit rating and the size of capital inflows 
from the United States enters significantly, consistent with flight-to-quality, and 
adds substantially to the explanatory power of the model. Finally, the size of the 
                                           
4  The significance of this variable depends on the inclusion of Ireland in the sample. However, 
this is not true for the interactive term, which is more robust to individual countries. 
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adjusted R-squared statistics is consistent with capital inflows playing an important 
role in explaining the downturn, while trade channels are of less importance.  
Table 2: Explaining the Slowdown 





  –0.043 
(0.662) 
CRX   –0.007 
(0.775) 
   0.039 
(0.144) 











2 –0.036  –0.072  0.133  0.278  0.294 
Observations 29  29  27  27  27 
Notes:  Dependent variable: real GDP growth rate in the year to 2008:Q4, less the growth rate in the previous 
year. P-values are in parentheses; bold indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. X equals exports to 
the United States and TCI is gross capital inflows from the United States, each as a percentage of GDP, in 
2007. CRX and CRTCI are interactive terms, where CR is S&P sovereign foreign currency credit rating
in 2007. CR=0 corresponds to a AAA rating, 1 for AA+, and so on, to 12 for BB–. 
 
In summary, this evidence suggests the possibility that a financial channel may be 
important for the international propagation of shocks. Moreover, it is difficult to 
explain the scale and synchronicity of the global downturn based on trade alone.  
3.  The Model 
In this section we describe a basic two-country model with levered borrowers and 
lenders in each country. The countries are called home and foreign. Within each 
country there are investors and savers, both of whom have infinite horizons and 
use the same fixed asset in production (with no capital accumulation, this is 
literally in fixed supply). Investors purchase the fixed asset and rent it to 
production firms, receiving a risky return in exchange. We may think of this 
investment as the purchase of an equity claim in the production firm. Investors are 
more impatient than savers, so they will borrow from savers in order to invest in 
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the fixed asset.5 Savers also make use of the fixed asset in home production. 
Savers therefore choose a portfolio in which they hold the debt of investors and the 
fixed asset. By assumption, savers do not hold domestic or foreign equity. In the 
current version, we assume that savers do not lend to foreign investors. Because 
the model is symmetric, this makes little difference for the results.  
)
Investors in either country, however, may trade claims with investors in the other 
country so as to diversify their portfolio of equity holdings. Thus investors in each 
country hold levered investments, but also have equity portfolios that are   
interconnected across countries. Finally, both investors and savers in each country 
supply labour inelastically to production firms.  
3.1  Investors 
We normalise the population of each country to unity, with a measure   of 










   (1) 
where 
I
s C  is consumption of the final good. To keep the analysis focused solely on 
financial linkages between countries, it is assumed that there is just one world 
good. Adding an endogenous terms of trade to the analysis would enrich the 
response, but would not fundamentally alter the cross-country transmission of 
balance sheet adjustments modelled here, so long as the elasticity of substitution 
across home and foreign goods is not close to unity.6 
                                           
5 Because they are more impatient than savers, investors will never accumulate enough 
resources to cover the cost of investment in any period.  
6 As is well known, with an elasticity of substitution equal to unity, there is a high   
cross-country correlation of consumption purely due to the risk-sharing implications of terms 
of trade adjustment. This is seen, for instance, in the paper by Dedola and Lombardo (2009). 
Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2004) explore the importance of terms of trade movements 
in affecting borrowing constraints in an emerging market economy framework. Extending our 
model to a setting with endogenous terms of trade would affect borrowing constraints through 
the impact of an adjustment of the terms of trade on net worth in a similar way to the effects 
of asset price changes in the present version of the model. 
 11 
We define the discount factor for investors such that: 
  1 (), () 0
II I I I I
ss ss CC   

  ,  
where 
I
s C  is the economy-wide average consumption of investors. Thus the 
investor’s time preference is increasing in consumption, but the rate of time 
preference is taken as given by the individual investor. The assumption of 
endogenous time preference for investors plays the usual role of ensuring a 
stationary distribution of wealth among groups, both within countries and across 
countries. But it also plays a key role in allowing for a comparison of an economy 
in which financial constraints bind with one where they do not bind, as we discuss 
below.  
Investors receive income from their current holdings of domestic and foreign 
equity, as well as labour income from working in the domestic production firm. In 
addition, they must repay their debts owed to domestic savers. They then issue new 
debt, purchase equity claims on home and foreign assets/capital and consume. The 
home country investor’s budget constraint is written as: 
  11 22 1 1 11 2 2 21 1 1 () ( )
II I I I II
tt tt t t tK t t tK t t t t t Cq kq kW qRk qRk BR B
I
          , (2) 
where:   and   represent the price of the fixed asset (or equity) in the home and 
foreign country, respectively; and   and   are the portfolio holdings of the fixed 
assets in each country held by the home investor. The fixed asset of the home 
(foreign) country earns a return of 






1Kt R  ( 2Kt R ).   is wage income for the 




t B  is the debt issued to 
domestic savers and  1
I
tt 1 R B   is payment on previously incurred debt.  
One may question why only investors can purchase the fixed assets, which are then 
used by final goods firms. As in Bernanke et al (1999), we could assume that 
investors (or, in their model, entrepreneurs) have some special capability for 
transforming a unit of the fixed asset into a usable factor of production that is 
rented to production firms. Lenders cannot do this, and so may gain only indirectly 
from the investment, by lending to the investors.  
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In addition to Constraint (2), we assume that investors face a constraint on total 
leverage due to an inability to commit to repayment, as in Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997). Total debt is assumed to be restricted to be no greater than  times the 
market value of equity assets, where 1   . Thus home investors’ choices are 
constrained by: 
  11 22 (
II
tt t t )
I
t B qk qk   . (3) 
The full leverage rate (the value of assets to capital) for investors is then 1/ (1 )    
in the case where the Leverage Constraint (3) is binding. We take   as a free 
variable in our analysis. Leverage constraints of this form have been used quite 
widely in the literature on asset prices (Aiyagari and Gertler 1999), emerging 
market crises (Mendoza and Smith 2006), borrowing in a small open economy 
(Uribe 2006) and monetary policy with credit frictions (Iacoviello 2005). Kiyotaki 
and Moore (1997) show that   may depend on the borrowing rate and expected 
capital gains on equity under some circumstances. 


Investors in the home country choose investment in home equity and foreign 
equity, as well as borrowing, to maximise their expected utility subject to their 
Budget Constraint (2) and Leverage Constraint (3), which implies: 




'( ) ( ) '( )






t   


 , (4) 




'( ) ( ) '( )












  1 '( ) ( ) '( )
II I I
ttt t t UC E CUC R     ,  (6) 
where    is the multiplier on the leverage constraint, or equivalently the utility 
benefit of an extra unit of debt to the investor. If this is positive, it means that the 
investor would like to borrow more, but is constrained by Equation (3). Therefore 
current marginal utility is less than expected future (discounted) marginal utility 
times the return on investing in either the home or foreign country. Thus   is a 
measure of the value of the opportunity to make a levered investment. To show 
this, put Equations (4), (5) and (6) together to obtain: 
 13 
 
1, 1 2, 1
1
(1 )
() ' ( )
1









   
     
, (7) 
where:  1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, /( ) tt tt tt qk qk qkt  
1 1 , 1 1, () / tt K t t R q   
, 1 2 , 1 2, () / tt K t t R q   
 is the share in home equity; 
 is the return on the home equity; and 
 is the return on the foreign equity. Equation (7) shows 
that, for a given distribution of excess returns and consumption, 
1, 1 1, rq
2, 1 2 rq
  is higher the 
higher is the leverage rate. It also implies that, when 0   , the expected return on 
the portfolio, up to the first-order, exceeds the cost of borrowing.  
Note that the leverage constraint does not directly affect the investors’ incentive to 
diversify equity holdings across countries, since Constraint (3) applies equally to 
borrowing for domestic or foreign equity purchases. Thus we may put 
Equations (4) and (5) together to get the standard portfolio selection condition: 
















 . (8) 
Given that the portfolio choice may be written in the form of Equation (8), we can 
use the recent methods described in Devereux and Sutherland (forthcoming) to 
derive the optimal equity portfolio of each country’s investors. This involves using 
a second-order approximation of Equation (8) in conjunction with a linear 
approximation of the remaining aspects of the model. We discuss the details 
involved in portfolio choice more fully below.  
3.2  Savers 







  . (9) 
Again, as for investors, we define the discount factor such that  1 ()
SS S S
s ss C     , 
with  '( ) 0
SS
s C   , where 
S
s C , is the economy-wide aggregate consumption of 
savers. We make the assumption that savers are inherently more ‘patient’ than 
investors in the sense that: 
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  () ()
SI x x   , (10) 
for all feasible values of x. Assumption (10) ensures that savers will lend to 
investors, even in a steady state where the Leverage Constraint (3) is not binding.7 
Savers purchase the fixed asset and buy debt from investors. They receive wage 
income from working in the final goods sector, and returns on their lending to 
investors. In addition, they have a residual ‘home production function’ that uses 
the fixed asset. Thus an individual saver owning   of the fixed asset produces 




) 0 1, (
S
t Gk ) 1, '(
S
t Gk  . For simplicity, we assume 
that home production is perfectly substitutable with the final good in savers’ 
preferences. With this assumption, we may write the saver’s budget constraint as: 
  11 111 11 1 1 ()
SS SS SS
tt t tt t t t t t Cq kWq k G k BR B
S
         . (11) 
Note that, by assumption, savers can purchase the domestic fixed asset, but not the 
foreign fixed asset. (As is made clear below, if investors are in debt,  , then 
; see Equation (19).) They do not have access to the same investment 
opportunities as investors and therefore only have use for the domestic fixed asset, 
as it may be utilised in home production. On the other hand, savers’ purchases of 

















'( ) ( ) '( )
S













                                          
, (12) 
  .  (13)  1 '( ) ( ) '( )
SS S S
ttt t UC E CUC R   
 
7  An alternative, but considerably more difficult, approach to achieving an equilibrium with 
levered investment is to assume that investors are less risk averse than savers. Solving a 
model with leverage based on risk preferences would be substantially harder than the 
approach we follow, because we would need to solve the full stochastic model to a higher 
order of approximation.  
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3.3  Production Firms 
Production firms in each country hire capital and fixed assets in order to produce. 
Firms are competitive, and maximise profits given the production function: 
  (, ) ttt t YA F L K  , (14) 
where  t L  is effective employment and  t K  is the firm’s use of the fixed asset. We 
allow for labour supplied by investors and savers to have different fixed productive 
content. Thus 
II SS
ttt L L   L , where 
I  and 
S  are fixed effective productivity 
factors. Profit maximisation then implies that: 
  , (15)  1(, )
II
tt t WA F L K   t
t   , (16)  1(, )
SS
tt t WA F L K  
  1, 2 (, ) K tt t t R AF L K  . (17) 
3.4  Equilibrium 
Equilibrium of the two-country world economy entails market clearing for the 
world market of the fixed asset, as well as each country’s debt market. Thus, for 
the home economy, it must be the case that: 
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where   represents foreign country investors’ real holdings of the home asset at 
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This condition incorporates the fact that the total labour supply of investors and 
savers is   and 1  respectively, and total use of the fixed factor by final goods 
firms is equal to total holdings by domestic and foreign investors. The full 
equilibrium is then described by Equations (2)–(6) and (11)–(19) for both the home 
and foreign country, and the world market clearing Condition (19). This gives 
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t W 1, K t R  and 
2, K t R ; one equation is redundant given Walras’ law. 
3.5  Properties of the Steady State 
Before examining the dynamics of balance sheet adjustments within the model, we 
first discuss some properties of the non-stochastic steady state. This is particularly 
easy in the case of  , which is when leverage constraints do not bind. It 
then follows from a combination of Equations (4) and (6), together with 
Equations (12) and (13), that the fixed asset is allocated efficiently between the 
final good sector and home production. That is, for the home economy, we have: 
* 0  
  , (21)  12 ˆ '( ) ( , )




where  represents the total quantity of the fixed asset used in the final 
goods production sector. Thus the fixed asset is allocated efficiently in the sense 
that its marginal product is equalised between home production and final goods 
production.  
*
111 ˆII kkk 
In combination with the Resource Constraint (17),  11 ˆ (1 ) 1
I nk n k   , this 
uniquely determines the allocation of assets in final goods production. Therefore 
there is no interdependence across countries in asset allocation in steady state when 
leverage constraints do not bind. Hence output levels are independent across 
countries – a permanent increase in productivity A affects home output, but not 
foreign output.  
In fact, we can extend this result further. In the case where leverage constraints 
never bind, it is easy to see that there is no interaction between asset allocations 
across countries at all, at least up to a first-order approximation. This can be seen 
















    ,  
where  1   and  2   are constant coefficients. Hence the dynamic paths of asset 
allocations are independent across countries in the absence of balance sheet 
constraints.8 Note that this holds despite the fact that, up to a first-order, expected 
returns on all assets are equalised both within and across countries. 
A more general feature of this environment is that portfolio holdings have no 
feedback effect on asset allocations. That is, allocation of the fixed asset between 
home production and investment in the final good is independent of the ownership 
of equities. This property will not hold in an economy with binding leverage 
constraints.  
When leverage constraints bind, we again use Equations (4), (6), (12) and (13) to 
obtain the steady-state condition: 
  1
(1 ) ˆ '( ) ( , )
(1 ) ( )
IS
SI
SI S I Gk A FL n k
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. (22) 
From Condition (3), because investors face a higher cost of finance, it must be true 
that  so it follows that, under binding 
leverage constraints, the final goods sector has an inefficiently low level of the 
fixed asset. More generally, however, since discount factors are endogenous, the 
allocation of fixed assets across sectors will no longer be independent across 
countries. Asset allocation in the home country will depend on the level of 
productivity in the foreign country. Intuitively this holds because, with free trade in 
equities across countries, returns to investors must be equal in both countries. 
Since returns interact with movements in consumption through the endogenous 
rate of time preference, Equation (22) shows that the division of resources between 
home production and final goods must be linked across countries as well. It 
therefore follows that, unlike the case in which leverage constraints are not 
(1 ) /[ (1 ) ( )] 1
IS SI S I       
 
8  Of course this is not a robust feature, and would be altered in a model with endogenous labour 
supply or capital accumulation. But the main point here is to show that the presence of 
balance sheet constraints introduces substantial additional forces for cross-country 
correlations that would otherwise be absent.  
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binding, the cross-country ownership of equity holdings will in general have 
implications for the allocation of investment in fixed assets.  
Even in the case of constant time preferences, however, the presence of leverage 
constraints would still imply a dynamic interaction between output levels across 
countries that is absent without these constraints, because productivity shocks to 
one country will affect the tightness of leverage constraints across all financial 
markets. We explore this in detail below.  
3.6  Portfolio Choice 
We have already solved for the overall allocation of the fixed asset in each country 
in steady state, but not the ownership structure of equities. Thus, while   is 
determined by Equations (21) or (22) with non-binding or binding leverage 
constraints respectively,   and   are not yet determined. Clearly, in order to 
analyse the dynamic response to productivity shocks in one country, it is necessary 
to understand the structure of equity holdings. To do this, we follow Devereux and 
Sutherland (forthcoming) in using a second-order expansion of Equation (8) to 







Since only investors have access to equity markets by assumption, it is sufficient to 
look at the portfolio decisions of home and foreign investors. To illustrate the 
application of Devereux and Sutherland (forthcoming) to the present model, take 
the Budget Constraint (2) for home country investors. This may be rewritten as: 
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t where   denotes net foreign assets, defined as  , 
and 
t NFA 22 1 1 1 ˆ ()
II
tt t t t NFA q k q k k 
xt r  is the excess return on the portfolio: 
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For given  , the portfolio choice may be described as the choice of 




tk  11 11
I
tt t qk   
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foreign investors. If  0 t   , the investors are diversified in the sense that less than 
100 per cent of all home equity is owned by home investors. Devereux and 
Sutherland (forthcoming) show that, when the model is analysed up to a first-order 
approximation,  t   is a constant and is determined by a combination of a   
second-order approximation of Equation (8), together with a first-order 
approximation of the rest of the model.  
In the solution below, following Tille and van Wincoop (2007), we extend 
Equation (8) to allow for transactions costs of international financial trade that 
effectively limit international portfolio diversification. This represents a   
brute-force technique for generating an equilibrium with home equity bias. In 
particular, we assume that an ‘iceberg’ cost factor given by exp( ) 1    reduces the 
returns that home investors receive from foreign investment so that Condition (8) 
becomes: 











    
'(   

. (8′) 
In addition, we follow Tille and Van Wincoop in assuming that   is a small, 
second-order term. This means that while it does affect the solution for the 
equilibrium portfolio, which is evaluated using a second-order approximation of 
Equation (8′), it does not affect the first-order dynamics of the model, except 
insofar as it affects the choice of the portfolio itself.  
Note that given the definition of net foreign assets (NFA), the leverage constraint 
for home country investors becomes: 
  11 ˆ (
I
tt ) t t B NFA q k   . (24) 
Thus, holding home asset prices constant, an increase in net foreign assets 
generated by either a current account surplus or a capital gain on the external 
portfolio will loosen the leverage constraint. But since 
* 0 tt NFA NFA   , this will 
simultaneously tighten the leverage constraint facing foreign investors. Thus the 
degree to which leverage linkages govern the transmission of shocks across 
countries depends on the dynamics of net foreign assets, and these in turn are 
linked to the portfolio choices made by home and foreign investors. 
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3.7  Calibration 
Because the model is such a stripped-down representation of a full-scale DSGE 
framework, lacking capital accumulation and dynamics in the supply of labour, and 
containing only a single world good, there are many dimensions in which the 
model’s predictions will depart from reality. The aim of the exercise is solely to 
explore the way in which financial leverage constraints affect the cross-country 
dynamics of asset prices, asset allocations and levered investments, and to 
investigate the international transmission of balance sheet contractions. To do this 
we need to choose parameter values for preferences, production technologies and 
the leverage constraint itself. Table 3 gives the set of parameter values used in the 
baseline model.  
We assume that the measure of investors and savers is equal, so that  . In the 
leverage-constrained economy, this accords with the estimates of Campbell and 
Mankiw (1990) regarding the share of households that are subject to credit 
constraints in the US economy.  
0.5 n 
Table 3: Calibration 
Parameter Description  Value 
n  Share of investors  0.5 
I  ,    S  Effective labour productivity  1 
  Discount factors are 0.96 and 0.94 for investors and savers, 
respectively (according to parameter  ) 
   Discount factor parameter  0.01 
   Leverage constraint  0.5, 0.8 
   Cobb Douglas production  0.5 
   Home production  0.36 
   Risk aversion  5 
   Productivity shock persistence  0.9 
 
We assume a discount factor defined as: 
 () CC
 
  . 
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We set  0.01   , and choose   so that, in a steady state with binding leverage 
constraints, lenders and borrowers have discount factors of 0.96 and 0.94 
respectively. The parameter   directly determines the total value of assets that 
investors can borrow. Since the model is calibrated in a symmetric way, net foreign 
assets are zero in steady state so that home investors’ net worth, measured as total 




1 ) qk ˆ    (and similarly,   for foreign 
investors). 
22 ˆ (1 )
I qk  
Total leverage (investment relative to capital) is equal to 1 . This leverage 
ratio has a significant effect on the model’s dynamics quantitatively. We examine 
two alternatives. First, in response to the discussion of the high rates of leverage 
seen in the financial system in recent years we explore the implications of a 
relatively high leverage ratio of 5 (
/ (1 )  
0.8   ). Second, we also consider a relatively 
low leverage ratio of 2 ( ), as in Bernanke and Gertler (1999). From a 
qualitative point of view, we will see that the results are very similar for both 
leverage ratios.  
0.5  
We assume a Cobb-Douglas final goods production technology, and let 
1 (, ) FLK LK
    . In order to have substantial propagation effects from leverage 
constraints, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) require that production in the borrowing 
sector is linear in the fixed asset. Kocherlakota (2000) shows that, with a more 
conventional calibration allowing for decreasing returns, credit constraints have 
much less impact. We set  0.5   , implying substantial decreasing returns, yet find 
substantial effects of leverage constraints, as we will see. Our choice of   implies 
that fixed assets are slightly more important than conventional measures of 
capital’s share in calibrations of the US economy.9 In addition we assume that 
effective labour productivity of savers and lenders is initially equal, so that 
.  1
IS  
Regarding the home production sector, we assume that  1 ()
S GZ k
   and  0.36   , 
implying that the fixed asset is less important in this sector, consistent with 
convention. We set  1 A Z   in steady state. The combination of these 
assumptions implies that, in steady state, 80 per cent of the fixed asset is employed 
in final goods production. We follow the asset pricing literature (see, for example, 
                                           
9  For many emerging market economies, however, estimates of capital share equal to 50 per 
cent are quite common.  
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Bansal and Yaron 2004) in setting a relatively high degree of risk aversion with 
5    in 
1 () / ( 1 ) UC C
 
  . Lower values of   reduce the volatility of asset 
prices, but have little qualitative effect on the results otherwise.  
We focus on shocks to the productivity of final goods in each country. The 
stochastic process for final goods productivity is modeled as: 
  1 ) log( ) t AA log( , t  t      (25) 
where 0.9   1 0 tt E ,     and  . We assume that foreign productivity is 
driven by the same process, and foreign and domestic productivity shocks are 
uncorrelated.  
2 0.02   
2
4.  Effects of Productivity Shocks 
In this section we look at how the combination of balance sheet constraints with 
portfolio interdependence affects the model’s response to a productivity shocks in 
one country. The focus on a productivity shock is not of central importance. The 
main elements of the propagation mechanism hold also for other shocks. The key 
aspect of the model is to show that the two features of portfolio interdependence 
and balance sheet constraints introduce a substantial process of macroeconomic  
co-movement that is absent when these features are not present.  
4.1  No Leverage Constraints 
We first examine the impact of a 1 per cent adverse productivity shock in the home 
country, in the environment without leverage constraints. Figures 3 and 4 describe 
the impact of the shock on consumption of investors, asset prices, lending by 
savers, asset allocation, the internal lending rate and the consumption of savers. 
Figure 3 represents the case where portfolio diversification is restricted by second-
order transactions costs as described above, while Figure 4 describes the case of 
unrestricted portfolios. In the unrestricted case, investors in the home country 






0   . This involves home investors having a bias against home equities. This 
reflects the fact that investors are exposed to non-diversifiable risk from wage 
income, which is positively correlated with the return on home equity. With an 
 23 
unrestricted portfolio, they will hedge this risk by taking a larger position in 
foreign equity than home equity, as discussed in Baxter and Jehrmann (1997). 
Given the calibration of the model, in an unrestricted equilibrium  . That 
is, home investors would hold only 20 per cent of total home equity (that is, 20 per 
cent of the fixed assets which are invested in the home final goods technology), 
with foreign investors holding the remaining 80 per cent.  
1 ˆ 0.2
I k  1
I k
Figure 3: No Leverage Constraints, Partial Diversification 
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Since this is clearly counterfactual, we use the iceberg cost variable   as a crude 
mechanism to match the optimal portfolios more closely with observed home bias 
in equity holdings. In Figure 3,   has been chosen so that  , implying 
that home investors hold 75 per cent of home equity. Figure 4, by contrast, 
illustrates the counterfactual case where there is full consumption risk-sharing for 
investors due to unrestricted diversification. 
1 .75
I k  1
I k ˆ
The responses to a productivity shock are quite similar in each of the figures. 
Without leverage constraints, the impact of a fall in home country productivity is 
to reduce consumption of investors in both countries, by identical amounts in the 
case of unrestricted diversification. The shock represents a temporary fall in 
consumption. Since consumption is expected to increase in the future, real interest 
rates must rise. The combination of a lower return on the home asset and rising real 
interest rates means that the home asset price must immediately fall.  
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Without leverage constraints, all returns are equalised, at least up to a first-order 
approximation, in order for investors to be willing to hold all assets in their 
portfolios. Thus the price of foreign assets must also fall. That is, arbitrage implies 
that the rate of return to lenders rises by the same amount in both countries, even 
though lenders do not directly engage in international borrowing or lending. But 
the pattern of lending moves in different directions in the two countries, as do 
lenders’ portfolios. In the home country, there is a fall in investment in the fixed 
asset in the final goods sector simply because this sector has suffered a persistent 
negative technology shock. This leads to an increase in the holdings of the fixed 
asset by lenders. They shift the composition of their portfolios from debt towards 
increased holdings of the fixed asset. Thus lending falls in the home country. In the 
foreign country, by contrast, there is no change at all in the allocation of the fixed 
asset. But lending in the foreign country actually rises, as investors borrow more 
from lenders in order to cushion against the temporary fall in their investment 
income.  
A different way to see this is that in the foreign country, lenders are offered a 
higher rate of return on their lending, and are willing to purchase more debt from 
foreign investors. Either way we look at it, lending rises in the foreign country, 
while it falls in the home country. In this sense, there is no international 
transmission of balance sheet contractions.  
The impact of the shock on lenders’ consumption in the two countries also moves 
in opposite directions. Lenders in the home country lose, since they suffer a direct 
fall in their wage income. Lenders in the foreign country gain, since they lend 
more at higher interest rates, and their wage income and holdings of the fixed asset 
are unaffected. Clearly lenders cannot achieve full consumption risk-sharing, since 
they cannot directly hold a claim on the equity of the other country.  
In the economy without leverage constraints, then, the international transmission of 
shocks is limited, and clearly counterfactual, relative to the discussion of the 
empirical evidence of financial spillovers in Section 2. A negative productivity 
shock in the home country leads to balance sheet contractions domestically, as 
investors reduce both their borrowing and holdings of fixed assets. But there are no 
foreign balance sheet contractions. Investment in fixed assets is completely 
unaffected in the foreign country, and foreign investors actually increase their 
borrowing. More critically, there is no international transmission of the shock to 
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GDP at all. Since the foreign asset allocation is unaffected by the domestic shock, 
foreign output is unchanged. Thus, in the absence of credit market imperfections, 
the possibility for the international transmission of shocks through balance sheet 
contractions is limited. 
4.2  Leverage Constraints and International Transmission 
Figures 5–8 show the impact of a negative productivity shock in the home country 
for the case when leverage constraints bind in both countries. Figures 5 and 6 
illustrate the case where the leverage ratio (LR) is relatively high at 5 – that is, the 
constraint is relatively ‘loose’; for Figure 5 investors’ portfolios are only partly 
diversified due to the presence of transactions costs while Figure 6 shows the case 
of unrestricted portfolio diversification.  
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Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the case where leverage is at a lower ratio of 2 – in the 
case of partial and full portfolio diversification respectively. In all cases there is a 
clear pattern of global balance sheet contractions in response to the shock.  
With high leverage and unrestricted portfolios (Figure 6), the home investor wishes 
to hold only 47 per cent of total home equity. While there is still some bias towards 
foreign equity, it is far less than in the economy without leverage constraints. That 
is, in an equilibrium without portfolio transactions costs, investors wish to hold 
more of their own equity when there are leverage constraints than when there are 
not. The reason is that the transmission of balance sheet contractions across 
countries with binding leverage constraints will make equity returns more 
positively correlated, as we see below. As a result, the gains from equity 
diversification are lessened. In Figure 5 we calibrate    so that investors hold   
75 per cent of domestic equity, as in Figure 3.  
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Without leverage constraints (as in Section 4.1), the fall in home country 
productivity leads to a fall in asset prices in both countries, and a fall in investors’ 
consumption. But now the fall in asset prices leads to a tightening of the leverage 
constraint, both in the home and foreign countries. The result is a reduction in 
borrowing by investors in both countries, and a consequent reduction in investment 
in fixed assets. Note that, for the foreign country, there is no direct fall in the 
productivity of the domestic final goods sector. The fall in investment takes place 
purely through balance sheet linkages. 
In addition, the price of foreign equity falls. But in spite of there being no direct 
shock to future return   2,1 K t R  , and a fall in the price of the asset, there is still a fall 
in demand for the asset by investors in both countries. This is the essence of the 
‘inverted demand curve’ for assets that characterises episodes of balance sheet 
contractions, emphasised by Aiyagari and Gertler (1999). Here it is taking place as 
a spillover from one levered investor to another, as emphasised by 
Krugman (2008). That is, a fall in the price of the asset held by one investor leads 
to a tightening of leverage constraints and a fall in demand for both the original 
asset and other assets held in the portfolio.  
Even in the case where portfolios are only partly diversified, there is a very high 
correlation across countries in borrowing and investment. The balance sheet 
contraction is so great that the internal lending rate in each country immediately 
falls. Again, note that this is in response to a temporary shock so that future 
consumption of investors is expected to increase. But because investors are subject 
to leverage constraints, the path of their consumption is de-linked from the path of 
interest rates. To see this more clearly, note from Equation (6) that there is a 
conflict between the Fisherian determinants of real interest rates and the effect of 
binding leverage constraints. Since consumption falls for both home and foreign 
investors, but is expected to rise in the future, real interest rates should rise. But 
this effect is more than offset by the increase in the shadow price of borrowing due 
to the leverage constraint. The fall in asset prices leads to such a large balance 
sheet contraction in both countries, and correspondingly a large rise in the shadow 
price of borrowing, that the real interest rate offered by lenders falls (at least in 
year 2) rather than rises.  
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The fall in asset prices is of a similar order of magnitude in the   
leverage-constrained economy as in the unconstrained economy. Asset prices 
display a V-shaped response, however, falling further in the second year than in the 
first. This is due to the fall in lending rates. Since lenders are unconstrained, the 
fall in returns on lending must be accompanied by a fall in the expected returns for 
lenders holding fixed assets for home production. Hence, immediately following 
the shock, asset prices are expected to fall further.  
Note that there is a distinct difference between the constrained and unconstrained 
economy, not just in the direction of the international transmission of shocks, but 
also in the scale. In the unconstrained economy (with partial diversification), a 
1 per cent decline in final goods’ sector productivity leads to an approximately 
1 per cent fall in borrowing from lenders, but only a 0.3 per cent reduction in fixed 
asset investment. Not only is there an absence of international transmission via 
balance sheet contractions, but the domestic impact of the shock is also relatively 
mild. By contrast, the response of the constrained economy is larger by orders of 
magnitude. Borrowing falls by almost 5 per cent in the home economy and 
investment in fixed assets by almost 4 per cent. Even in the foreign economy, the 
multiplied effect of the shock is very large – investment falls by over 3 per cent 
and borrowing by 4 per cent. In both countries, the response to the shock is 
proportionally much larger than the shock itself, due to the interaction of asset 
price declines and binding leverage constraints.  
Consumption of home and foreign investors also falls by more in the constrained 
economy than in the unconstrained economy, although the decline is less persistent 
with leverage constraints. Also, in contrast to the economy without constraints, 
consumption falls for all categories of households, both for investors and lenders, 
in both countries. The fall in interest rates on lending in the foreign country 
eliminates the positive wealth effect we saw foreign lenders receive in the 
unconstrained economy.  
When portfolio diversification is unrestricted, Figure 6 shows that the international 
transmission of the shocks is heightened even more. In fact, we get the surprising 
prediction that the size of the balance sheet contraction and disinvestment is 
greater in the foreign country than in the home country! Borrowing falls by 5 per 
cent in the foreign economy, and investment 4 per cent, while the equivalent 
reductions in the home economy are 4 per cent and 3.5 per cent respectively.  
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Why does greater portfolio diversification magnify the international propagation 
effects of the shock? The reason is clear from the Leverage Constraints (3) or (23). 
Increased diversification leads to a greater sensitivity of foreign balance sheets to 
the domestic asset price, and therefore a larger balance sheet contraction in 
response to a negative shock to home productivity. In the completely unrestricted 
portfolio equilibrium (when  0   ), the foreign country is over-weighted in home 
equity, as part of an optimal risk sharing arrangement. So the macroeconomic 
reverberations of the shock are greater in the foreign country than the domestic 
country, despite the fact that the actual shock takes place only in the home 
economy. Thus the ownership pattern of equity holdings, and its consequent 
implication for balance sheet constraints in this case, are more important for the 
business cycle response than is the geographical source of macro shocks. 
A second important feature of Figure 6 is that full portfolio diversification cannot 
ensure full consumption risk-sharing in the leverage-constrained economy, unlike 
the case of an economy without leverage constraints. This is because the evolution 
of domestic interest rates, and hence the domestic debt burden facing investors, is 
no longer identical across the two countries. Since equity market diversification 
cannot diversify risk associated with country-specific interest rate movements, 
unrestricted equity market integration (that is, when  0   ) no longer achieves full 
consumption risk-sharing in response to productivity shocks. Figure 6 shows that 
home and foreign investors’ consumption are initially equalised, but foreign 
consumption rises above home consumption because the home lending rate is 
higher during the transition to a steady state. 
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Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the response to a home productivity decline in the case 
where leverage is lower ( ), for partial and full portfolio diversification 
respectively. In Figure 8, full diversification entails the home country investors 
holding only 25 per cent of the home equity, while in Figure 7 home country 
investors are constrained to hold 75 per cent of home equity. The pattern of 
responses is very similar to that in the high leverage case, but the magnitude of the 
responses is lower – borrowing and asset disinvestment are both less than in the 
previous case, although there is still a substantial multiplier effect of the original 
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4.3  Unconditional Moments 
Table 4 reports the unconditional moments of the model under the assumption that 
productivity shocks in both countries follow identical but uncorrelated 
distributions, given by Equation (25). 
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Table 4: Unconditional Moments 
Leverage constraints  None  High (LR=5)  Low (LR=2) 
Diversification Partial  Full  Partial  Full  Partial  Full 
SDEV( )
I C   2.9 3.0 3.9 4.0 3.1  2.9 
SDEV( )
S C   0.4 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.5  0.5 
SDEV( ) q   4.7 5.2 4.7 4.9 5.1  5.0 
SDEV( ) R   0.6 0.7 2.0 2.0 0.9  0.9 
ˆ SDEV( )
I k   0.8 0.9  11.0  11.3 4.2  4.0 
12 CORR( , ) qq   0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99  0.98 
12 ˆˆ CORR( , )
II kk  0.02 0.04 0.99 0.98 0.99  0.98 
* CORR( , ) R R   – – 0.99  0.99  0.99  0.97 
 
As is evident from the figures, the model with binding leverage constraints 
displays substantially more overall volatility than the model where leverage 
constraints are absent. Consumption of investors is 50 per cent more volatile with 
‘loose’ leverage constraints, and consumption of savers is twice as volatile. Asset 
price volatility is relatively unchanged with and without leverage constraints but 
investment volatility is vastly higher, as is clear from a comparison of Figures 3 
and 5. Investment correlation across countries is essentially zero in the economy 
without leverage constraints, but almost perfect in the economy with leverage 
constraints. Table 4 therefore underscores the main message of the paper. In the 
presence of credit market imperfections, balance sheet linkages across financial 
institutions can generate a very powerful mechanism for the international 
transmission of business cycle shocks.  
4.4  Gross Portfolio Adjustment  
In the first-order approximation of the model described in Figures 3–8, the 
dynamics are computed around a constant portfolio position. Changes in the 
portfolio affect the evolution of the real economy only at the second-order level. 
Nevertheless, we may still compute the implied adjustments in the gross portfolios 
using the approach of Devereux and Sutherland (2009).10 In response to a negative 
                                           
10 This involves taking a second-order expansion of the dynamic model, in conjunction with a 
third-order expansion of the portfolio selection Equation (8).  
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technology shock, investors in both countries will adjust their gross external 
positions. Initially, the home country investors have a position of 
 <0 , implying that their net holdings of domestic equity is 
negative, while net holdings of foreign equity are positive. In response to a 
negative home productivity shock, gross asset holdings are adjusted downward. 
Holding of domestic equity increases (the net position gets less negative), and 
holding of foreign equity decreases. This occurs in both the economy without 
leverage constraints and that with leverage constraints, as illustrated in Figure 9. 
The current account locus represents the movement of the home economy’s net 
foreign asset position in each case, given that the country begins holding the 
optimal portfolio. In each case NFA increases, because the country is hedged 
against the possibility of a negative productivity shock. But the positive movement 
in NFA is comprised of an increase in the holdings of home equity, and a reduction 
in the holdings of foreign equity – investors scale down their outstanding positions 
on each side, selling some of their foreign equity and buying back home equity. 
Equivalently, home agents reduce their outstanding holdings of foreign equity, and 
foreign agents reduce their holdings of home equity. Thus there is a reduction in 
gross capital flows, similar to that seen in the recent data discussed in Section 2. As 
Figure 9 illustrates, this dynamic response occurs in both the unconstrained and 
constrained economies. But the scale of the drawdown is much bigger in the 
leverage-constrained economy. In that case, the fall in holdings of foreign equity 
(and reduction in foreign holdings of home equity) is approximately three times as 
large as in the unconstrained economy. Again, the presence of balance sheet 
constraints imparts a substantial magnification to the response of gross capital 
flows to the original shock. 
11 11 11 ˆ (
II
ttt t qk k     )
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Figure 9: Gross Capital Flows, Partial Diversification 












































5.  Conclusions 
This paper has provided empirical evidence on the importance of balance sheet 
adjustments in propagating business cycle shocks across countries. Financial 
interdependence, combined with financial vulnerabilities, can open a channel for 
the transmission of shocks that may be as important as standard trade linkages. We 
have used this evidence to construct a simple two-country model in which highly 
levered financial institutions hold interconnected portfolios, and may be limited in 
their investment activity by capital constraints. The combination of portfolio 
interdependence and capital constraints leads a negative shock in one country to 
precipitate an episode of global balance sheet contractions and disinvestment. In 
this sense our model may be seen as a formal general equilibrium representation of 
Krugman (2008), who suggests that interconnections in financial markets may give 
rise to an ‘international finance multiplier’. In our model we find that, with high 
initial levels of leverage, the global effects of the shock may be substantially 
magnified. While the model illustrates the importance of financial connections, it 
abstracts from trade linkages. In a more elaborate model, it would be desirable to 
quantitatively investigate the relative importance of the two separate channels.  
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